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CONSTRUCTION OF WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS
(Concluded)
By RICHARD R. POWELL*
FOURTH:

Problems of constructioninvolving future interests in donative
conveyances.
My address on this third day of our series will concern
itself with the diagnosis and resolution of problems of construction involving future interests in donative conveyances.
As statutes were our topic of yesterday, so wills and voluntary declarations of trusts, grouped together under the label
of donative conveyances, are to constitute the sub-topic of
this afternoon. Insofar as these instruments create trusts
they raise abundant problems as to the powers wisely to be
conferred upon trustees as to the duty of the trustee to safeguard the trust res, and simultaneously to produce reasonable
income for the current beneficiaries of the trust, and as to
the allocation of expenses incurred, and of funds received.
With none of these problems peculiarly thought of as trust
law do I propose to deal. Instead I shall ask your attention
*Professor of Law at Columbia University School of Law. Continued from
the February and April Issues of the Journal.
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to certain aspects of these instruments which center about their
creation of, or their attempts to create, future interests.
Within the field thus delimited I hope to present some ideas
which will aid in two particulars.
Before one can resolve a problem he must be aware of the
existence of a problem demanding resolution. I have encountered in the State of New York many lawyers who have
said to me with a straight face that they never had encountered a problem in future interest during their long careers
at the bar. To each such one, if I knew him well enough
to be frank, I said, "That is merely because you have not
seen the problems when you met them."
The revelations of science are constantly telling us of
things which go on about us without our knowledge. There
are sounds that are too loud, as well as too low, to register
on our ears. There are light rays-infra red and ultra
violet-which our eyes are not tuned to see. So also within
the field of law there are problems which pass us by as a ship
passing in the night without making even a ripple in our
consciousness.
When I search the decisions of Indiana and find large
areas in the law of future interests, with scant authority, or
even without a single decision, I am led to wonder how greatly
this is due to the problems not having arisen and how greatly
it may be due to the problems having passed unseen when
actually presented by the sets of facts which have passed
through your law offices.
I know, of course, that future interests typically are not
created by the owners of small wealth. One must have
$50,000.00, shall we say, or more, before division into present
and future interests becomes a likely mode of distribution.
But Indiana has had many citizens with wealth far in excess
of this minimum, and their dispositions have in fact divided
the property into present and future interests. In a state
where the bar has proved itself so able to make the most
of available legal business, as your change of venue system
proves you to be, I am somewhat astonished at the failure
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of your bar to see the opportunities for legitimate and profitable business in this field of future interests.
In the older days, and perhaps still today in many law
schopls, future interests is a subject avoided by law students
as something fearsome and terrible to encounter. I am glad
to say that in the Law Schools of Columbia and of Harvard
Universities this is no longer true. In my own institution
the course is voluntarily elected by over ninety-five per cent
of the students. In Harvard it has been made a compulsory
course. And so it is my desire today to spend these two
hours together in opening up before you some of the neglected
possibilities offered by this field.
Diagnosis in law is like diagnosis in medicine. Excellence
in it presupposes extensive awareness of the possibilities
which can be encountered. So I shall spend a part of today's
time on a presentation of these possibilities. After the problem has been 'seen, has been classified and isolated, its resolution remains. Here we need to know how far the statutes
and decisions of our own State fix for us a path which must be
followed. In this State of Indiana your freedom of action
is not, in most particulars, greatly hampered by other local
statute or an extensive body of precedents. Here then is preeminently a place in which the resolution of problems requires
an awareness of the experiences of other States. Here then
is a place where the Restatement of the Law of Property
can be useful, and where you, as lawyers anxious simultaneously to serve yourselves and your clients, cannot afford to
disregard the work which the American Law Institute has
done in this field. The realization that many States are in
exactly the position in which Indiana now is, was the chief
reason for the Institute devoting its resources and efforts
to the production of the Volumes II and III of the Restatement of Property.
Volume II appeared two years ago and contains some
529 pages of text. Volume III is to appear this coming year
and will contain some 700 pages of text. Into the preparation of those two volumes much has gone. The money expended in work upon them runs above $200,000.00. I have
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spent upwards of one-third of my entire time on them for the
past ten years. Besides this I have had as a Board of Advisers
nine men recognized throughout the country as the leading
scholars in this field. They are: Bigelow, who is dean of
the University of Chicago Law School; Casner, who was
formerly the professor at Illinois and is now teaching property at Harvard University; Fraser, who is the Dean of the
University of Minnesota Law School; Leach, who is also
a teacher of property law at Harvard; Madden, who was
formerly of the Pittsburgh Law School, and has been Chairman of the National Labor Relations Board for the past
several years; Rundell, of Wisconsin; Simes of Michigan;
and Henry Upson Sims, former President of the American
Bar Association, and probably the leading lawyer of Birmingham, Alabama.
Since I can do no better for you in the time at our joint
disposal today than to give you a genuine introduction to
the helpfulness available to you in this work, I desire to
take a few minutes to recount briefly the history of this
Institute so that you can all see its product in the light of the
circumstances of its formulation.
The Institute has been in existence since early in 1923-a
little over fifteen years. During that time, in the preparation of the restatements and in the compilation of its code of
criminal procedure, it has expended in a careful manner
calculated to get full value for each dollar expended close
to $2,000,000.00. It has brought into cooperative effort
lawyers, judges and law professors in a fashion never before
accomplished or even attempted. It has published some
twelve volumes and has some four or five more which can be
described as still in gestation. Its published works, down to
the 1st of January, 1938, have been cited over three thousand
times in the decisions of various courts in these United States.
Of these three thousand citations ten only were in opinions of
Indiana. Only eleven States had referred to it less oftenl
From this I find some basis for an inference that the extent
of knowledge as to the usefulness of the work of the Institute
is rather slight among both the lawyers and the judges of this
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State. In the firm belief that interest will be generated if
knowledge exists, I am anxious to continue to give you some
further data as to the background of the Institution and the
way in which it has been functioning.
First, then, as to the situation which demanded and
which still demands remedy, and to meet which the Institute
is designed as a response. That situation can be described
succinctly as the growing complexity and uncertainty of the
law. The multitude of reported decisions is appalling. For
the five years prior to 1914 the Library of Congress made a
count of American jurisdictions, showing more than 65,000
decisions, occupying 630 printed volumes. For five yearsl
Each ten years brings twenty-four or more new huge volumes
of the American Decennial Digest. "But," you may say,
"there are fifty-nine jurisdictions consisting of the fortyeight States, the District of Columbia and the ten Federal
Circuits, and I, as a lawyer in but one of these jurisdictions,
am concerned with a relatively small number of these."
That restriction of view to the decisions of one's own State
and circuit has become an habitual necessity because of the
human impossibility of any judge or lawyer keeping abreast
of current law elsewhere. Such acquaintance demands an
impossible expenditure of time and of labor and of money.
But this impossibility of acquaintance with the law of sister
States fosters divergencies of rule having no better justification than lack of knowledge as to how the problem has been
handled elsewhere. These divergencies become increasingly
troublesome as our State lines are more and more overrun by
nation-wide 'business units and common economic problems.
Furthermore, even in a single jurisdiction, both briefs and
opinions suffer from a lack of an adequate sifting of the
prior decisions. The pitfalls of the vast content of precedent
remind one of those illimitable regions described by Milton
where "chaos umpire sits, and by decision more embroils the
fray by which he reigns."
The complexity and uncertainty which result from multitude are aggravated by the prevailing lack of sharp accuracy
in the use of words. A judge already weary from his efforts
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to supplement counsels' presentation of prior authorities, and
faced only with the decision of the narrow issue in litigation
before him, does not deserve heavy censure if his opinion is
couched in language adequate to make clear the result in
the case before him but apt to mislead when sought to be
applied as a precedent removed from its context.
Does this situation, when appreciated, reveal an intrinsic
and inevitable weakness of the common-law system, certain
to bring about the destruction of that system at a time now
rapidly approaching? The Institute is a strong negative
answer made to that question by leaders of the Bar.
As the Director of the Institute, William Draper Lewis,
said to the Pennsylvania Bar Association in June of 1932,
"Not lightly should a people abandon an institution which
having its bed roots in their remote past has developed with
their development. Ou'r capacity for progress today is tested,
as always, not by our eagerness to discard the old in order
to adopt the new, but by our willingness to employ the institutions which our experience has taught us how to use, and, so
using them, model them to new needs."
The utility of a cooperative enterprise enlisting the judges,
practitioners and law teachers in an ascertainment and formulation of existing law was suggested by the late Mr. Justice
Cardozo in December, 1921, at an address delivered in the
City of Chicago. He likened the resultant process to that
which occurs in the consulting room of an appellate court
where pet hobbies find derision, personal peculiarities of
thought are curbed and the ultimate fusion of views acquires
a balance, a moderation and a prestige not otherwise attainable. The outcome of this suggestion was the organization
of a committee to explore the possibilities of the idea and to
suggest ways and means for its accomplishment.
William Draper Lewis, who was then Dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law School and a distinguished
lawyer of Philadelphia, became the indefatigable promoter
of the enterprise. By his skillful efforts the late Elihu Root
became the guide and constant helper of the new movement.
John G. Milburn, George W. Wickersham and other men of
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like type spent liberally of their time in these months of
travail. By call of this committee the organization meeting
of the Institute occurred in Washington, D. C., on February
23, 1923. The personnel of that first meeting is indicative
of the character of the enterprise. It included three justices
of the United States Supreme Court, members of the Circuit
Courts of Appeal in five of the circuits, the chief justice or
an associate justice from the highest courts in twenty-seven
different States, some two-score of law teachers and upwards
of two hundred distinguished practicing lawyers selected from
the country as a whole. The charter adopted by this group
declared that it purposed "to promote the clarification and
simplification of the law and its better adaptation to social
needs, to secure the better administration of justice and to
carry on scholarly and scientific legal work."
A decade and a half is a short time in movements affecting
the welfare of a society consisting of 120,000,000 people.
But '1 submit that Mr. Lewis, Mr. Root, Mr. Wickersham
and those hundreds of others of the leaders of our profession
who have put to work the money of the Carnegie Foundation
have not only conceived a worthy ideal but have moved forward substantially toward its attainment along lines now
about to become of immediate practical utility alike to the
judge, to the office and litigating lawyer, and to the teacher
of law. This area of practical utility is certain to become
increasingly significant as more of the restatements emerge
from their long process of incubation. Clarification, simplification, elimination of unnecessary divergencies and inconsistencies are a service not only to the profession, but to the
public, to whom so often we have been but poor guides.
I think you are entitled to have a very brief description
of how this restatement group functions. I can describe
that best, perhaps, in connection with the property restatement where I have had the task under my direction. It is
my task, first, to prepare a collection of the authorities from
the country as a whole on the subject which we are about to
restate. That memorandum varies in length, as you would
suspect, according to the subject. In the course of the ten
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years that we have been working I have collected in my office
some 12,000 to 14,000 cases in the field of future interests.
On the subject of class gifts, which has been the subject
matter of our work this past year, we have a collection of
some 1500 cases digested, and we discarded some 1500 more
which were merely cumulative authority on points which were
already adequately covered. On the basis of such a preliminary law memorandum I, as reporter, prepare a first draft
of a chapter dealing with a certain unit of the subject matter.
The law memorandum and the draft are both mimeographed
and are distributed to the group of advisers which I enumerated a few moments ago in your hearing. They then meet
with me at some central point. We spend about four days
on a draft of fifty pages. That means rather minute consideration, because we normally sit some seven hours a day
in those sessions. So we spend together about twenty-eight
hours of work chewing to pieces a fifty-page draft. You can
guess that there is often not much left after that process has
gone onl A stenographic record is kept of their suggestions.
I go back home with those suggestions and my mutilated
draft, and it is my job to reconstruct a new draft along the
line of their suggestions. It comes back to a similar group
meeting. That occurs with varying repetitions according to
the difficulty that we encounter in the chapter. No single
chapter has come through in less than three group meetings
of that type. One took eight meetings of that type to get
it into shape where we were willing to put it out.
Having thus survived this group the draft then goes to the
Council of the Institute, which is a group composed of thirtythree practicing lawyers and judges. The membership in the
first group, as you see, is largely a law school crowd. The
membership in the Council is entirely judges and practicing
lawyers. They consider the draft, and if it looks to them
correct, they approve it and pass it on, with such suggestions
as seem to them desirable.
It then goes to the Annual Meeting in Washington, which
occurs early in May, where some 700 persons congregate
from different parts of the country. Only after it has been
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approved by the group, by the Council and by the Annual
Meeting, does it come out as a published Restatement.
Now, these two volumes of which I have been speaking
contain twenty-one chapters, and I want to run over their
general scope with you and then take up for detailed discussion three of the chapters. The twenty chapters divide
into four parts. The first part is a single chapter of some
sixty to seventy pages dealing with terminology. The effort
of that chapter is to define our terms in the field so that there
will be no uncertainty as to the content of a given name. That
chapter was not written first; it was written after ten others.
In other words, we did not write our chapter on terminology
until we had gone through ten chapters of substance to find
out what terms needed definition and how we could best
define them in terms of their use. The chapter on terminology
is Chapter 7.
Next comes a series of ten chapters on the characteristics
of future interests. Quite obviously, I can't give you in five
minutes the substance of those ten chapters, but I do want
to indicate their general subject matter.
First, we deal with the subject of transferability, and
there are really four chapters which center about that subject: transferability by conveyance inter vivos; transferability
by succession on death; transferability that occurs when you
subject a future interest to the satisfaction of the claims of
creditors; the tranfer that is implicit in a partition proceeding
or in a judicially ordered sale of the property.
These four are followed by four more chapters which
deal with the protection of future interests. First there is
the protection that is accorded to future interests by the
requirement that the owner of it shall have been made a
party to a proceeding that affects the subject matter of the
interest. Secondly is the protection that is afforded in the
way of actions for damages or in equitable actions for an
injunction or in equitable proceedings for the appointment of
a receiver. Thirdly is the protection which is accorded against
persons other than the owner of the prior possessory interest
as for example when some third person proceeds against the
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property and injures it. And lastly the limits that are set to
these protections by the statutes of limitations. Thus the
first eight chapters are divided into two groups of four each.
The last two of the chapters on characteristics deal with
ineffectiveness. Such an ineffectiveness may exist as to the
ultimate interest. I have a limitation "to B and his heirs,
but if B dies without issue at any time, over to C and his
heirs." C dies before the testator so that the doctrine of
lapse applies. Does the first interest become indefeasible
or does the first interest end upon the death of B without
issue? So our first problem concerns the ineffectiveness of
the ultimate interest and the resultant enlargement, in some
instances, of the prior interest.
More difficult than that, much more troublesome, is the
ineffectiveness of the prior interest. A limits property to
his wife, B, for life, and, after her death, to certain people.
In many States the spouse can reject the testamentary provision for her and claim her intestate share. If that is done,
the life estate drops out of the picture. What then happens
to the balance of the testamentary disposition? Do you
accelerate the subsequent interests so that they move up and
become presently possessory to the extent that they are not
absorbed by the intestate share of the wife ? Do you sequester
the interest that was attempted to be given to the woman and
distribute it for the ironing out of inequalities between the
subsequent takers? The doctrine of renunciation and the
doctrines of acceleration and sequestration come in to give
much trouble, many problems.
Lastly the material dealt with in Chapter 17 deals with
the termination of an interest and the effect thereof on succeeding interests. You have all heard of the destructability
of contingent remainders, and that is a question which is
important in your State because you have no statute on the
subject.
Those ten chapters on the characteristics of future interests
which I have so briefly described in your presence are designed
to show when it makes a difference in the result of a contro-
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versy, whether a future interest is of one type or another.
Having determined, therefore, the extent to which it is important to differentiate between types of future interests, we now
proceed with the balance of the material. In the Third
Volume, which is not yet published, we deal with the construction questions-questions which enable the lawyer and judge
to determine what types of future interests the particular
limitation before him creates and thereby to determine what
the consequences of the limitation are under the rules stated
in the preceding ten chapters.
In this Third Volume there are to be at least six chapters
dealing with the construction of conveyances which purport
to create these various types of future interests. The first
of those chapters is the one on general rules of construction
and c6vers substantially the same material as I lectured to
you upon on my first day here insofar as I was then discussing
donative conveyances. In the tentative draft (No. 9), which
was published last May, there are three chapters centering
about the three most litigated questions of construction. The
first of those is the requirement of survival-when is a future
interest so limited that the person to take must live until the
time of distribution? That is the requirement of survival.
The second deals with limitations over on death, or on death
without issue. That is the second of the three most litigated
questions in this field. The third deals with those limitations which are conditional upon behavior. You give property to a son provided he supports the grantor and the
grantor's wife as long as they live, and so on. So those three
chapters center about the types of construction problems most
frequently litigated.
In the part that has not yet been published even in tentative
form we deal with the subject matter of class gifts. That
has been the subject matter of our work this past year.
I must move on, because I want to discuss with you today
the utility and the applications of the material that you will
find in three of those chapters in this State of Indiana. And
the three chapters that I have selected for such discussion
are Chapter 7, which is in the published Volume II, on
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terminology and classification; Chapter 20, which is in tentative draft, No. 9, that was published last May, on gifts
over on death, and on death without issue, and Chapters 22
to 23-I will consider those as one chapter for our purposes
today-as yet unpublished, on class gifts.
Why do I think it important to discuss with you Chapter 7
on terminology and classification? I suspect every one of
you, no matter how much you may have done or how little
you may have done in this field, has heard of reversions, remainders and executory interests. There are echoes of those
words in all of our minds even though we are very hazy as
to the differences between them. An expert in the field, of
course, talks of many more and of many subdivisions. What
materiality is there in this pigeon-holing of future interests
under specific names? I submit that these names are not
mere survivals of historic accidents-although all do reach
back into history and do gain a part of their content because
they reach into different eras of history having arms of
variant lengths. They are not mere excess baggage usable
by the initiate desiring to give an appearance of importance
in the view of the uninitiated. They serve presently useful
objectives as a shorthand mode of transition from the varying forms of limitation by which each can be created to the
varying aggregates of consequences which each connotes.
That, to me, is the sole justification for the present retention
of the historically derived names of future interests.
What, then, is the classification that you will find in this
material and how far does it fit into the attitudes of your
courts in this State?
First of all, let us divide future interests into those that
are created in persons other than the conveyor; and then
later we shall consider those which are created or left in the
conveyor.
As to those created in persons other than the conveyor,
there is the sharp line of demarcation between remainders
and executory interests. The remainder developed earlier as
a legal interest. It came in about the fourteenth century.
It was typically the type of future interest left after a life
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estate. That is, A, having complete ownership, conveyed
property to B for life, and then it shall remain over to C,
as the phrase originally was. From that phraseology the
term "remainder" came. It meant the type of future interest which is created in a person other than the conveyor,
typically after a life estate.
The executory interest, on the other hand, did not come
into the law as a legal interest until after the Statute of Uses
and Statute of Wills, just before the middle of the sixteenth
century. Typically the executory interest was after a fee
interest of the conveyor. Thus A, having property, conveys
property to B and his heirs, and on certain stated events
over to C and his heirs. The executory interest was the type
of interest creatable as a result of the Statute of Uses and
the Statute of Wills and was limited typically after a prior
estate not certain to end.
Those two types of future interests-remainders and
executory interests--differ not only in the types of limitations
that create them, but they differ also in their characteristics.
I can not take time to illustrate that extensively, but this
will serve to show what I mean. If you have a remainder
after a life estate, you are dealing with a future interest
that is certain sometime to become possessory, and consequently that interest is entitled to be protected against wrongful conduct on the part of the person in possession, that is to
be protected normally by an action at law for damages.
Whereas if it is an executory interest, you are dealing with
an interest that is not certain ever to become possessory,
and consequently the protections accorded to it by way of law
action are nil and in equity are slight.
With respect to remainders we need to make a further
subclassification. You are familiar with the traditional division
into vested and contingent interests. And here we must stop
for a few moments of careful thinking. The terms "vested"
and "contingent" have been important in Anglo-American law
for upwards of six centuries, but the differences that are
connoted by those two words have shifted in content from
century to century, and a failure to realize that shift in
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content is one reason for real confusion in the writings and
decisions of today.
Originally, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, remainders could only be created in favor of presently identifiable persons. The interests of such persons were "vested"
and were seldom if ever subject to any possible defeat. When
the intended taker was not presently identifiable, a "contingency" existed and that meant no interest was created.
Thus, in the first stage, "vested" estates were allowed estates
whereas the label "contingent" designated the unsuccessful
effort to create an interest. Contingent remainders gained a
hesitant recognition between 1450 and 1536 and the distinction between "vested remainders" and "contingent remainders" centered in the fact that the latter type of
remainder could eventuate in possession, if, but only if, the
condition precedent was fulfilled at or before the expiration
of the supporting estate of freehold. Thus in the second
stage these terms both designated allowed interests, but interests differentiated chiefly by widely varying degrees of
probability of becoming possessory.
The Statute of Uses (1536) and the Statute of Wills
(1540) introduced executory interests and powers of appointment, both of which could operate to defeat "vested remainders." So the spread of defeasible vested remainders
lessened the clarity of the distinction between vested remainders and contingent remainders based upon the probability of becoming possessory, since that probability could be
just as effectively lessened by a provision for the defeat of
the interest as by a condition precedent thereto. Nevertheless,
the "destructibility" of contingent remainders by the termination of the supporting estate of freehold prior to the fulfillment of the condition precedent kept the distinction one of
importance to the legal profession. Judicial efforts to avoid
this destructibility caused many border-line limitations to be
construed as creating "remainders vested subject to defeasance" rather than a remainder subject to a condition
precedent. Thus in the third stage the terms were applied
chiefly to differentiate remainders which respectively were
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and were not "destructible." The development of the rule
against perpetuities beginning in the late seventeenth century
gave a new opportunity for the pouring of old wine into new
bottles. Thus in the fourth stage the terms "vested" and
"contingent" were pressed into service to differentiate interests
which, in order to be valid, do and do not need to have
something further happen within the permissible period
under that rule.
I think that this little historical excursion has made it clear
that there are incongruities between those remainders commonly grouped together as vested. Consequently, in the
Restatement, you will find a three-fold subdivision of the
remainders that are commonly grouped together as vested.
The three-fold subdivisions are: (1) indefeasibly vested
remainders; (2) remainders that are defeasibly vested; and
(3) remainders that are vested subject to open. Let me
illustrate these three with situations familiar to you here in
Indiana.
The indefeasibly vested remainder is the one most favored
in Indiana. It is illustrated best, perhaps, by the illustration:
A to B for life and then to C. C's interest is indefeasibly
vested. That means there is a person to take presently and
unalterably identified and his taking is certain whenever and
however the preceding estate ends. Such an interest results
in the maximum of protection being accorded to it by the
courts. In Indiana the preference for vesting which exists
everywhere throughout the country has become almost a
phobia against finding anything less than indefeasibly vested
interests. I shall have more to say about that just a bit later.
The defeasibly vested remainder is well illustrated in
Heilman v. Heilman,1 a case where a man, A, gave his property to "my wife, B, for life, with power to consume, remainder to my children." It is a very common form of
limitation. The power to consume given to the life tenant
means that there may be nothing left for the children. Under
1 129 Ind. 59 (1891).
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such a limitation the children have a remainder vested subject
to complete defeasance.
Williams v. Harrison,2 involved another defeasibly vested
remainder of a slightly varying type. There the limitation
was "to my son B in trust for his children C and D and any
other child or children that may hereafter be born to him,
to be applied to the support and education of such children
or the survivor or survivors of them; the share of each child
to be paid to him on coming of age or marriage and to survivors if one dies before such receipt." You see, the interest
in the children was vested subject to complete defeasance by
failing either to live to maturity or to marry.
Summers v. Old First National Bank and Trust Company3
is another case in which the remainder was defeasibly vested.
One-fourth of the residue was given in trust for a son, B,
until he reformed, and then to him outright. But the will
went on: "Should my son die before the conclusion of this
trust over to my daughters Mary, Ella and Elizabeth." Mary,
Ella and Elizabeth each had a remainder vested subject to
complete defeasance, if and when the son, B, reformed.
These three cases illustrate the types of defeasibly vested
remainders that you find in the decisions of the fairly recent
years in this State.
What do we mean by a remainder vested subject to open?
Conger v. Lowe, 4 illustrates that. Testator gave "to my wife
Hannah for her life, then to my son Silas during such part
of his life as he shall live on this land, then to the children of
Silas." When the testator died in 1874 Silas had four children. Each of these four acquired a remainder interest in a
quarter subject to become a fifth only on the birth of a fifth
child to Silas, and so on as to each other child of Silas. Thus
your remainder vested subject to open exists when the group
consists of presently ascertainable persons, each certain to
take some share, but the size of the share is subject to be
272 Ind. App. 245 (1919).
313 N. E. (2d) 320 (Ind. App., 1938).
4124 Ind. 368 (1890).

CONSTRUCTION

OF WRITTEN

INSTRUMENTS

diminished by further birth of further persons who fit into
the class.
In addition to these three types of remainders that are of
varying degrees of vestedness, there is the remainder subject
to condition precedent, and despite the best efforts of your
courts to find everything that they can vested, there still are
some remainders subject to a condition precedent in your cases.
Dickey v. Citizens' State Bank of Fairmont5 is one such case.
The testator there had made quite ample other provisions
for all of his family, including his son, and then he wanted
to make an additional provision for the additional expenditures which would be incurred by this boy if he married, so he
made the limitation in controversy, devising land "to my wife,
B, for life, and if, at her death my son, C, is at that time
married and living with his wife, then to C in fee simple,
otherwise the property is to be sold and the proceeds divided
among" three named charitable institutions. That interest of
C was construed to be subject to three conditions precedent.
He must outlive his mother, B. He must marry before his
mother died. He must be living with his wife when B dies.
The interest was subject to a three-fold condition precedent.
So we find ourselves with five varieties of future interests
which can be created in a person other than the conveyor.
Each has its own series of possible creating limitations and
each has its own peculiar agglomerate of characteristics.
We must pass rather hastily over the interests which are
left in the conveyor. They are two main types, with three
subdivisions of one of these two.
First of all is the power of termination-the right to enter
for condition broken, which is reserved to a conveyor. You
have an illustration of that in Cree v. Sherfy.8 So we have the
right to enter for condition broken, which, in the Restatement,
we call the power of termination.
Then we have reversionary interests-but reversionary interests can exist in three different forms. The simplest form
5 98 Ind. App. 58 (1932).

6 138 Ind. 354- (1894).
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of the reversionary interest is where A, having a fee, conveys
to B for life. He still has all the balance of his ownership.
He has an interest like an indefeasible remainder. But supposing he does differently than that. Supposing he conveys,
as he did in the Dickey case, which I discussed with you a few
moments ago, to his wife for life and then to the son C on
condition precedent. What has he left then? He still has
the entire reversion, but this retained interest is subject to
be defeated by the occurrence of the condition precedent of
the interest limited in the third person. That reversionary
interest is very like the remainder vested subject to complete
defeasance.
Can we also find a reversionary interest which is subject
to a condition precedent? How about Mendenhall v. First
New Church of Indianapolis?7 Land was conveyed to this
church organization for such time as they should use it as a
church and Sunday school. That created a defeasible interest
in the church. What was left in the conveyor? He had the
chance of getting back that property if the defeasible interest
created in the church ended.
Isn't the retained interest of the conveyor rather accurately
described as a reversionary interest subject to a condition
precedent? We more commonly speak of it as a possibility of
reverter, but I submit to you that the possibility of reverter
is nothing but a rather roundabout mode of describing a reversionary interest subject to a condition precedent.
So we really have left in the conveyor four varieties of
future interests-the power of termination, the indefeasibly
vested reversion, the defeasibly vested reversion, and the
reversion subject to a condition precedent, which you can call,
if you prefer, the possibility of reverter.
Thus we have nine categories, nine pigeon-holes, or to
change the metaphor, nine bridges, each leading from distinct congeries of creating conveyances to distinct congeries
of consequent characteristics. Careful observation of the
terminologies thus set forth will increase precision in our
7 177 Ind. 336 (1912).
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thought, will cause us more quickly to apprehend the problems
upon which we must work; will contribute clarity to both
briefs and opinions, and will make this difficult subject less
difficult than it heretofore has been. These terminologies set
forth in Chapter 7 of the Restatement of Property are
not new either in this or any other State. They merely utilize
and put into compact and readily accessible form the best that
has been done by the best of our judges and legal thinkers of
the past. They are the sharp tools which justifiably increase
the confidence of a good technician as he approaches a complex written instrument which requires construction. Chapter 7 in the published Volume II of the Restatement of the
Law of Property does not itself settle any of your problems.
It does facilitate your approach to problems, it quickens your
apprehension of problems, and thus saves time, which is the
chief commodity which we, as lawyers, have to sell.
The utility of Chapter 20, dealing with limitations involving
a gift over on "death" or on "death without issue" is very
different. Here we are concerned with substance, and if I
may be permitted to say so, with a substance which Indiana
needs.
The State of Indiana is unique in its handling of the
problems which this chapter concerns. In order that we may
get a proper perspective I want to take a few moments to
show you the historical background of limitations of this type.
There has been a very long history as to gifts over on death
without issue. The importance of the estate tail in English
society was great from the fourteenth to the nineteenth centuries. The typical settlement made of property in England
employed the estate tail so as to provide that the land should
go down the line of the eldest son until it became extinct,
and if and when that line became extinct it should then go
down the line of the second son, and so on through the family.
Out of that common practice of conveyancing arose the idea
which is described as a gift over on indefinite failure of issue.
The term "indefinite failure of issue" is a term applied to a
gift over that is intended to operate whenever in the futureno matter how far in the future it may be-that the line

416

INDIANA

LAW JOURNAL

becomes extinct. Thus if property was granted by A to B
and his heirs, but if B died without issue, over to C and his
heirs, that limitation was construed to give to the first taker
an estate tail, which meant that it would stay in his line of
descent as long as there were descendants, and then, and then
only, pass over to C. That construction of limitations as
embodying an indefinite failure of issue had its acceptance
because of the English social interests in estate tail.
In this country we have never been greatly interested in
estates tail. Our whole social set-up has been to such an
extent different that that type of land interest has not met
our desires or our needs. There has been no such situation
in this country as there was in England favorable to the estate
tail. Consequently there has been no favor in this country
for the indefinite failure of issue construction. This was
quite clearly manifested in the enactment of statutes in some
of our States providing in effect that when you had one of
these limitations, theretofore construed to mean indefinite
failure of issue, it should henceforth be presumed to mean
definite failure of issue. That meant that the gift over
would take effect if, but only if, the first taker was unsurvived
by issue at the time of his death. So let's take a limitation
and see the difference of result under those two: A to B and
his heirs, but if B dies without issue, to C and his heirs. Under
the English view B had an estate tail and C had a remainder
after an estate tail. C's interest could take effect if, and only
if, B's line became ultimately extinct. Whereas under a statute
that substituted the preference for definite failure of issue,
C could take only if, when B died, B was then unsurvived by
issue.
Do you see that preference for the definite failure of issue
construction eliminated wholly the estate tail from the picture
and moved up the time when you looked at the facts for the
ascertainment of whether the gift over could take effect? The
change was in the direction of lessening the long tie-ups of
land.
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Statutes of that sort, establishing a preference for the
definite failure of conception began with the Virginia statute
of 1819.8 Right at that same period, within about a decade,
similar statutes were passed in Mississippi, 9 in North Carolina10 and in New York. 1 ' England made a similar shift in
1838 by the statute of the First Victoria Chapter 26, § 29.
Statutes of this sort spread in this country so that long prior
to this time they have been enacted in twenty-seven States,
in addition to the District of Columbia. But Indiana is not
one of the States that has such a statute. The statutory body
of law through the country doesn't help you in this State at all.
Now, what should a state do when it doesn't have a statute
on this subject? The fact that it doesn't have a statute
doesn't in any way eliminate the distaste for estate tail, nor
does it in any way eliminate the distaste for indefinite failure
of issue. Some States met the situation by shifting to the
definite failure of issue construction by judicial decision.
Perhaps one of the best illustrations that I can bring to you
of that is a decision written in Kentucky prior to the time
that Kentucky enacted the statute. Kentucky has since enacted one of the statutes adopting the definite failure of issue
construction. But before they had such a statute the question
was up before their courts, and in Moore v. Moore,'2 the
court said this, which I want to read to you: "Issue, in common parlance, and as used generally by the community, signifies immediate descendants-children. And to tell those who
have not made the law their study, that the phrase 'if Martha
should die without issue,' does not contemplate her death
without an immediate descendant of her body, at her death,
but a failure of those lineally descended from her, a hundred
8 Va. Rev. Code (1819), c. 99, § 26.
9 Laws (1822), c.104, §26.
10 Acts 1827-8, c. 7.
11Rev. Stat. (1830), pt. 2, c. 1, Tit. 2, Art. I, §22.
12 12 B. Monroe 651 (1851).
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or two hundred years subsequently to her death, is to tell
them not only what surprises them, but what they do not
understand, and what they cannot be easily made to apprehend.

*

*

*

And yet this artificial, ungrammatical and

unnatural interpretation of the phrase, is to be applied to the
construction of their wills, in order to ascertain and give effect
to their meaning I Is it not tantalizing the community to allow
them the privilege of making their wills if the courts iri construing and interpreting them, are to wrest the language they
employ from its plain and obvious meaning and import, and
by applying strained, artificial and arbitrary rules of interpretation, make them mean what it is acknowledged they do not
mean? We say what it is acknowledged they do not mean;
for, not only many of the judges of our own country have
substantially made such acknowledgment, but Lord Thurlow
is reported to have said, in the case of Bigge v. Bensley: 'I
agree with you, that the general sense of dying without issue,
is at the time of the death. That is the grammatical construction, and is the sense in general of those who use the words.'
"We are free to confess that the weight of English authority is opposed to the interpretation which we are disposed to
give them. But whatever may have been the causes which
originated arid continued the unnatural signification which the
English Judiciary attached to these words; whether owing to
the genius of their government, or to the spirit of their laws
growing out of their entailment, it is certain that their Courts
of Chancery, as if conscious of original and continued error,
seize with avidity any words in a will to tie up the generality
of the expression 'dying without issue,' and confine it to
'dying without issue living at the time of the decease'; at
least, in regard to terms for years, and personal estate; and
we are utterly unable to see any good reason in this country
for a different construction of the same words when applied to
real estate."
So the. Kentucky court made the shift from the indefinite
failure of issue construction to the definite failure of issue
construction, by judicial legislation.
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Connecticut, 13 Florida, 14 Illinois,'
New Hampshire,'
Ohio, 1 7 and Texas' 8 made the shift in the same way.
Now, Indiana took an independent route of escape by
stressing the substitutional viewpoint. Thus if A executes a
will in favor of "B and his heirs, but if B dies without issue
over to C and his heirs," the Indiana decisions say that if B
outlives the testator he acquires forthwith an indefeasible
interest, and it makes no difference whether he thereafter dies
with or without issue. C is out. That is called the substitutional construction, because under it, one or the other person
takes. There is no situation under which first one takes and
then the other takes a future interest after it. There is no
successiveness to the interests. One or the other takes. And
therefore it is called the substitutional construction. Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania have all flirted with this same
idea, but they have gradually pulled themselves wholly free
from its entanglements. The State of Washington-with the
vigor of a recent convert-alone remains enamoured of this
false god. In re Gulstine's Estate9 adopted the doctrine in
1932 for the first time.
Now, how did Indiana happen to do this?
There are several contributing factors which I want to
mention. The Indiana judges were aware of the common law

preference for early vesting and for early indefeasibility.
Both of those doctrines played a large part at common law.
Both of those doctrines still play a large part everywhere
in this country. They are correct attitudes, if not overdone.
13 Couch v. Gorham, 1 Conn. 36 (1814); St. John v. Dann, 66 Conn. 40
(1895).
14 Russ v. Russ, 9 Fla. 105 (1860).
I Ahlfield v. Curtis, 229 Il1. 139 (1907).
16Kimball v. Penhallow, 60 N. H. 44S

(1881); McAllister v. Elliot, 83

N. H. 225 (1928).
17 Parish v. Ferris, 6 Ohio St. 563 (1856).
18 St. Paul Sanitarium v. Freeman, 102 Tex. 376 (1909).
'9 166 Wash. 325 (1932).
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Then there were prior correct decisions dealing with gifts
over on death alone. These also are a part of the background
of this misstep. Let me illustrate what I mean by the case of
Heilman v. Heilman.20 That case involved tbis limitation:
"to my children, and should any one of them be dead leaving
children, then such children shall take the share of their
parent." That is a gift over on death simply, "to my children" and should any of them be dead, then their children
take. That is obviously an attempt by the testator to provide
takers to take the place of a parent who dies before the
testator. Very properly the courts in this State and everywhere else apply a substitutional rule to that case. Death
being a certain event, as I think we all must concede it to be,
the contingency sought to be expressed by the limitation must
be as to the time of its occurrence, and hence, in such case,
survival past the death of the testator makes the interest indefeasible. The substituted gift is intended to prevent lapse
and such survival makes it no longer significant.
These, then, are the two contributing factors, as far as I
can find them, which explain Wright v. Charley.21 This is
the first case that misapplied these prior rules and reached
the substitutional construction in this State. So this doctrine
of which I am speaking is less than fifty years of age in your
State. Wright against Charley was a case of this sort: A
will had been executed in 1873. After giving property to
five unmarried and named children he provided: "in case of
the death of either of my (five unmarried) children and they
leave no children, the property bequeathed to them by this
will is to be divided between my (other) children." All five
survived the testator. One of the five died in 1888 without
offspring but with a husband. The controversy was between
this son-in-law of the testator and the remaining actual children of the testator. The husband won. The court relied
on the two factors above described, namely, the preference
for early vesting and the body of authority adopting the sub20129 Ind. 59 (1891).
21129 Ind. 257 (1891).
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stitutional construction in cases of gifts over on death simply.

The court cited English and New York cases as well as its
own decision made earlier in the same year in Heilman v.
Heilman210 as authority for its decision, but all of these
cases were on totally unsimilar forms of limitation, because
they dealt with gift over on death simply, whereas this was
a gift over on death without issue.
I think it is fair to say, if you read that case carefully,
that the court did not see that it was dealing with a different
kind of case, that it did not know that it was extending by
analogy where there was no basis for any analogy to be drawn.
The weed thus sown unwittingly has borne some most extraordinary fruit, and I want to bring some of that fruit to
your attention.
Moores v. Hare22 is the first of these cases. Testator
there gave "to my daughter Maria for life as a life estate and
not a fee (realty). At the death of her (said Maria) all the
said real estate so devised to her for life shall go to her children in fee simple. If any child of hers shall have died,
leaving a child or children, then the portion of said real
estate that would have gone to the parent shall go to such
child or children." At the time of probate Maria was a
widow and had four children, one of whom later died intestate and without issue. Maria is still alive. This is an action
by her children against their children to quiet title.
Here, the court had three choices: It could say that
any children of Maria who outlived the testator acquired
thereby an indefeasible interest; or it could say that any
child of Maria who outlived Maria, the life tenant, thereby
acquired an indefeasible interest; or it could have said,
applying the definite failure of issue construction that any
child of Maria continued to have a defeasible interest until
it was ascertained at the time of the death of such child,
whether she was survived by children. The court took
the first of-those three positions, holding that any child of
2111129 Ind. 59 (1891).
22144 Ind. 573 (1896).
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Maria who survived the testator acquired forthwith an
indefeasible interest.
Clark v. Thieme2 3 was a case in which there was an express
provision in the will making substituted gifts in the event that
any taker died before the testator; and then in the next clause
they had this gift over on death without issue of a particular
taker. Despite the detailed and specific provision to cover
death in the lifetime of the testator, they construed the other
and distinctive clause as having the same effect. It is a bit
difficult to see how that can be regarded as giving effect to the
intent expressed by the language of the instrument.
Aldred v. Sylvester 24 is a third case. Here there was a life

estate followed by an express gift to three brothers. This
was followed by a further provision that if any one of the
three died before the life tenant, survived by issue, it should
go to such issue. The court held that any one of these three
who survived the testator, acquired an indefeasible interest,
and that death of any one of the three prior to the life tenant
was of no effect. There was a complete disregard of the
express language of the instrument. The court had a guilty
conscience as it wrote that opinion, too I All the way through
you will find it talking in terms of intent, but peeping through
between the lines of the opinion is a feeling of uneasiness that
they are protesting a bit too much that they are following the
intent of the testator.
Quilliainv. Union Trust Co. 2 5 is one of the most outrageous
cases I have ever encountered in the decisions of any jurisdiction. It was a suit to quiet title to real estate. Item 6 of this
will provided as follows: "Subject to the foregoing provisions
and conditions I devise to my daughter Anna all my real and
personal estate forever, provided, however, that if my said
.
the propdaughter should die without issue, then .
erty she may have derived from my estate at the time of her
death shall have descended to my nephews and nieces."
23 181 Ind. 163 (1914).
24 184 Ind. 542 (1916).
25 194 Ind. 521 (1924).

CONSTRUCTION OF WRITTEN

INSTRUMENTS

Could you have it more explicit than that that successive
interests were intended; that Anna was intended to take; and
that the nephews and nieces were intended to take if there
was a failure of issue of Anna at the death of Anna? It is
almost impossible to frame language that would be more
appropriate to express that purpose. Daughter Anna survived the testator and died without issue surviving her, devising in trust to the Union Trust Company. The nephews and
nieces naturally came around and said, "Here are we; give
us." The Trust Company claimed by the terms of the will
that this girl had taken a fee and hence that her will transferred the property to the Trust Company and the nephews
and nieces were out of luck. The court held that it is a well
established rule in this State that words of survivorship are
presumed to relate to death of the testator. "Such rule has
been applied in so many cases where the language used was
of similar effect to that used in the case at bar that such construction has the force of a rule of property and should not
be disturbed." On the death of the testator Anna took a fee
simple.
O'Brien v. Clarke26 is one of the recent cases in your intermediate Court of Appeal. The testatrix provided in that
case, "I give to my daughter Mary for life, thereafter to my
daughter Catherine and my sons Joseph and James, but should
said Catherine, Joseph or James be childless at the time of his
respective death and still be the owner of any personal and
real estate hereinbefore provided for him, then I give it
over" to certain other people. That didn't do the trick. The
estates in remainder vested at testatrix's death, according to
the court.
McDowell v. Fletcher27 is another case of the same vintage.
Testatrix left all her property to her grandchildren "share
and share alike among them, but if any one or more of my
said grandchildren shall die at any time without issue surviving them the share . . . of such shall be equally divided
26 102 Ind. App. 421 (1936).
27 103 Ind. App. 165 (1936).

INDIANA

LAW JOURNAL

among his or her brothers and sisters and their descendants."
Note the express provision for "death at any time without
issue." It didn't work. The estate vested indefeasibly as of
the death of the testatrix.
The substitutional rule has become so strong by repetition
that an Indiana opinion which, in such cases, still talks in
terms of effectuating the intent of the conveyor, can hardly
mean what it says. Does this rule serve so useful an end
that you are entitled thus to defeat the desires of testators?
I can see none. It is a rule which grew out of an understandable and wise dissatisfaction with the continued reign of the
indefinite failure construction, but it is a rule which took
its form because a court nearly fifty years ago made a gross
error in reasoning, seeing no difference between two types
of limitation as different from each other as night is from day.
It is a rule which frustrates legitimate and reasonable desires
of testators. It has well-nigh become a fetish. It is a rule
which marks Indiana as unique, in a particular where uniqueness has naught to commend it.
In the Uniform Property Act drafted by the cooperative
efforts of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and
the Institute there is a provision which, if enacted in your
State, would work a wholesome change that is needed. This
section is thus worded: "Whenever property is limited upon
the death of any person without 'heirs' or 'heirs of the body'
or 'issue' general or special, or 'descendants' or 'offspring' or
'children' or any such relative described by other terms, such
limitation, unless a different intent is effectively manifested,
is a limitation to take effect only when such person dies not
having such relative living at the time of his death or in
gestation and born alive thereafter and is not a limitation
to take effect upon the indefinite failure of such relatives; nor,
unless a different intent is effectively manifested, does it mean
that death without such relative, in order to be material, must
occur in the lifetime of the creator of the interest."
That statute, if enacted, would work a very desirable
change, in my judgment, in the law of this State.
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I do not know how familiar you are with class gift law and
consequently I want to discuss the types of limitation which
create class gifts.
A makes a will leaving property "to my children." That
is one of the simplest forms. A makes a will leaving property
"to my wife B for life, then to my nephews and nieces." That
is substantially different from the first because of the interposed life estate, and also because there can be more nephews
and nieces born, provided the necessary parents are still alive,
as is, of course, often the case. There can't be such additional
members born, in the first case, where it is a limitation to the
children of the fellow that is now dead, whose will it is; so
there is a substantial difference in those two types of limitations.
Third-there are five of these illustrations which I think
will put before us most of the possibilities in class giftsA leaves a will in favor of "my son B for life, then to those
of the children of B who attain to the age of twenty-one."
Here, there is this new-element that only those will take who
survive to the date of distribution, an element not present in
either of the other two.
Fourth, A, by will, leaves "to my nephew B and to the
children of my brothers C and D." Here you have a problem
of distribution. Here also you have a problem as to whether
the named nephew B is a member of the class.
Fifth, "A to B for life and then to the heirs of C" a
limitation which uses the words "heirs" or "next of kin"
brings into the picture the statute of descent for the definition
of the takers and perhaps also for the definition of the size
of the shares.
The common limitations in favor of classes are either in
favor of "children," "grandchildren," "brothers," "nephews,"
"nieces," "cousins," "family," "heirs," "next of kin," or
"relatives." Those are the group designations which would
include probably all but five per cent of all the class gift cases.

INDIANA

LAW JOURNAL

What difference does it make whether the limitation creates
a class gift or not? There are three differences chiefly. Let's
illustrate them by the use of one assumed limitation: "A to
my wife B for life, then to my nephews and nieces." A
nephew C dies before the testator. All of those nephews
and nieces who fit the description when the will speaks take
the entire subject-matter of the disposition, and the failure
of one nephew to survive is unimportant; that is, the group
is a shifting group, which in this instance can decrease its
membership between the time the limitation is written and the
time it takes effect.
Let's take a variant on these facts for our second situation.
A executes a will in favor of "my wife B for life and then
to my nephews and nieces." Some time later he doesn't like
Nephew D so much, so he executes a codicil stating: "I
exclude my nephew, D, from any share in my estate." Does
that cause a failure in part of the prior disposition? Not at
all. It merely excludes that chap from the group who take
the entire subject-matter of the gift at the time the will
speaks. So, in these first two, the importance of finding the
class gift is because the results of finding a class gift are
peculiar when a person who fits the description either dies
before the testator or is excluded from taking by the terms
of the codicil executed by the testator.
In the third, the importance of finding a class gift is on the
expansibility of the crowd. You have this same limitation,
i.e., "to my wife, B, for life, remainder to my nephews and
nieces." As long as you have brothers and sisters alive that
group-nephews and nieces-can get bigger and bigger, and
all of them that are born subsequent to the time when the will
is executed up to the time when the testator dies, and in the
case of a life estate, such as I have given you here, until the
life tenant dies will come into the class. So there is an expansibility in the group taking if you find a class gift.
Now, in these chapters of the Restatement on the law of
class gifts we have sought to present an analytical approach
separating the rules concerning class gifts into a series of
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successive problems, and I want merely to mention those so
that you will see where you can find helpfulness in this type of
problem.
First of all, to have a class gift you have got to have words
of purchase in the limitation. You still have the Shelley's
Case as a part of your law. Consequently, if there is a limitation to B for life, remainder to the heirs of B, the rule in
Shelley's Case applies and B has a fee simple.
In such a limitation you have in terms a gift to a group,
"heirs of B," but the rule in Shelley's Case comes in, defeats
intent, and this language, which in form is a class gift, constitutes words of limitation rather than words of purchase.
You have a great many decisions applying the rule in
Shelley's Case. Most of them are older cases, and this is so,
I suspect, because all of you as lawyers have learned how to
avoid that rule and consequently the modern cases involving
modern conveyances very seldom contain a limitation that
comes within it. You also have the doctrine of worthier title
in this State. There is the case of Wheeler v. Loesch28 which
applies the doctrine of worthier title to this kind of a case.
I own Blackacre in fee simple. I execute a conveyance of
Blackacre "to B for life with remainder to the heirs of the
conveyor." Now, the doctrine of worthier title says that if a
will limits property to the heirs of the conveyor in such a
fashion that the same persons will take either by descent or
by purchase, they take by descent and the language of the instrument that purports to give them something is a nullity.
Here again you have a situation where the instrument
contains language that looks like a class gift but which is
prevented from being a class gift because of the rule which
comes in-i. e. the doctrine of worthier title-to prevent the
requisite words of purchase from being present. So the first
problem that we deal with in these chapters of the Restatement are the situations in which the language of the instrument lacks the essential words of purchase.
28 51 Ind. App. 262 (1912).
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The second problem is whether the limitation includes the
possibility of fluctuation in the takers under it. There is no
class gift, unless the language of the limitation is appropriate
to describe a group capable of fluctuating in number. That
problem comes up for litigation with great frequency in other
States. I can't find a case on it in your State. And frankly
I don't believe that this is true, because there haven't been
limitations that raised the question. To make clear the situation giving rise to the problem, let us suppose that a limitation
reads "in favor of B and C, that is, the children of my sister
D." Is this a class gift? You have named the people. You
have used a descriptive phrase concerning them. Does the
naming exclude the fluctuating capacity of the group? In
other words, to what extent does the naming of part or all of
the persons who fit the descriptive phrase employed exclude
the class gift construction?
Then, we consider as our third problem, what is the exclusionary force of the term that is used to describe the class.
Here I intend to go into a considerable number of your cases.
You have some nice cases on this point. I make a gift to "my
children." Does that exclude my illegitimate children, or
does it take effect only in favor of those children who were
legitimate at birth, or does it include those who were legitimate at birth, plus those who were legitimated subsequent to birth by, perhaps, the inter-marriage of the parents?
You have one most interesting case here, Elliott v. Elliott,29
in which the court recognized that the word "children" normally meant only legitimate issue; but under the facts of that
case they held that the word "children" designated the illegitimate children to the exclusion of the legitimates. The decision
was found on the facts of the case. I haven't time to go into
it. You would be interested in reading it. It was a situation
in which it was very clear that when this man used the word
"children" he was referring to a distinct brood who were in
fact his illegitimate offspring. So the question requires answer
as to whether the word "children" excludes the illegitimates;
29117 Ind. 380 (1888).
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and a further question-does it exclude adopted children?
That's another problem that's extremely difficult of resolution. It is not so difficult when it is a gift to the children of
the conveyor. But suppose that I make a gift to the children
of someone and then he adopts a half dozen children in addition to the three very nice ones that he now has, do all nine
share, or do only the three share? You have decisions on
that. 0
I make a gift to the children of X. He has none when
I die, but his wife gives birth to a child a couple of months
later. Does that child en ventre sa mere at the time of my
death come in as a taker under the terms of gift of children?
So you see there is a great deal of exclusionary force in the
term that is used to describe the group. It excludes sometimes
the illegitimates, it excludes sometimes the adopted, it excludes never the children en ventre sa mere, it excludes normally descendants more remote than issue of the first generation. So there is a large body of material. We have perhaps
some fifty pages in Chapter 22 on it, dealing with the exclusionary force of the term used to describe the group.
The fourth problem centers about the so-called rules of
convenience. You have a limitation, A to B for life, remainder to the children of C. How long can children born to
C come into this group? Certainly as long as B, the life
tenant, is alive. Supposing a child is born after the life tenant
dies, can he also claim a share? You have good cases on
that body of material.8 1
Fifth problem: How long can the class continue to decrease in membership? And there you have the problem of
the requirement of survival, a problem that brings into this
picture of the law of class gifts all the learning and knowledge
that you can get on the construction problems of vested
interests.
30 Bray v. Miles, 23 Ind. App. 4-32 (1899) ; Caspar v. Helvie, 83 Ind. App.
166 (1924-); Nickerson v. Hoover, 70 Ind. App. 34-3 (1919).
31 King v. Rea, 56 Ind. 1 (1877); Conger v. Lowe, 124 Ind. 368 (1890);
Kilgore v. Kilgore, 127 Ind. 276 (1890); Williams v. Harrison, 72 Ind. App.
245 (1920); Goodwin v. Goodwin, 48 Ind. 584- (1874).
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The last of the six problems is the problem of distribution.
I make a gift to the children of B and the children of C. B
has two children and C has ten children. Do they take in
twelfths or do the two children of B take a half and the ten
children of C take the other half ? So you see we have sought
by presenting in a series of successive sections these six problems which, when answered, give you the solution of the
ultimate taker under the terms of the class gift.
In our consideration today of the diagnosis and resolution
of problems of construction which arise in connection with
donative conveyances, I have tried to present to you three
types of help which you can expect to find in the second and
third volumes of the Restatement of the Law of Property.
In the first place you find there a sharpness of terminology
and a restricted but sufficient fineness of classification to
enable you not only to analyze the instrument before you for
construction, but also to determine the real relevancy of prior
decisions, thought, or argued to be in point. This is the
contribution of Chapter 7 in published Volume II. In the
second place, you find detailed presentations of the historical
and doctrinal background of gifts over on "death" and on
"death without issue" giving to you an awareness of the
uniqueness of the law of Indiana upon this point, and, I hope,
a desire to bring this one body of law into accord with your
general policy of will construction which gives large emphasis
to the effectuation of the resonable desires of testators. In
the third place, I have presented the skeleton treatment of
class gifts which will become available to you by March of next
year, and which will, I believe, aid the profession greatly in
so breaking down the problems raised by class gifts into a
series of relatively simple problems that they can be handled
separately and successively, so that this field of law will no
longer terrify or greatly trouble the practitioner.

